Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

The Invention of a Human Right: Conscientious Objection at the
United Nations, 1947-2011
Jeremy K. Kessler
Columbia Law School, jkessler@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, International
Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Invention of a Human Right: Conscientious Objection at the United Nations,
1947-2011, COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, VOL. 44, P. 753, 2013 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2529

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

THE INVENTION OF A HUMAN RIGHT:
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AT THE
UNITED NATIONS, 1947–2011

Jeremy K. Kessler*

The right of conscientious objection to military service is the
most startling of human rights. While human rights generally seek to
protect individuals from state power, the right of conscientious
objection radically alters the citizen-state relationship, subordinating
a state’s decisions about national security to the beliefs of the
individual citizen. In a world of nation-states jealous of their
sovereignty, how did the human right of conscientious objection
become an international legal doctrine? By answering that question,
this Article both clarifies the legal pedigree of the human right of
conscientious objection and sheds new light on the relationship
between international human rights law and national sovereignty.
In 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(“HRC”), for the first time in its history, found that a member state
had violated its citizen’s right of conscientious objection to military
service under Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).1 Yet the dissent of the Committee’s
American member, Ruth Wedgwood, cast a shadow over the
proceedings. Wedgwood noted that the Committee offered “no
evidence from the Covenant’s negotiating history to suggest” that
such a specific right was meant to be contained in Article 18.2 While
this Article affirms Wedgwood’s reading of the ICCPR’s negotiating
*
J.D./Ph.D. Candidate, Yale Law School and Yale University, Dept. of
History. For their feedback and encouragement, I extend my deep thanks
to Joshua Geltzer, Samuel Moyn, David Pozen, Reva Siegel, Cindy Tan, Adam
Tooze, Jay Winter, and John Fabian Witt. I would also like to thank the editors of
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review, especially Jason Hipp
and Gudrun Juffer, for their patience and care.
1.
Yoon & Choi v. Republic of Korea, Comm. No. 1321-1322/2004, Rep. of
the Human Rights Comm., Nov. 3, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/62/40; GAOR, 62nd Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, vol. II, annex VII, § 5, at 195 (Nov. 3, 2006).
2.
Id. at app. (Dissenting Opinion by Committee Member Ms. Ruth
Wedgwood).
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history, it unearths the later political and legal processes by which
the anti-war and anti-colonial movements successfully lobbied several
UN bodies—not just the HRC—to identify Article 18 with a human
right of conscientious objection.3 In telling this neglected story, the
Article provides what John Witt has called a “social history of
international law.”4 This kind of social history has contemporary legal
relevance, as it can identify the multiple sources of a doctrine’s
legitimacy, sources that international lawyers risk discounting when
they rely on a textualist reading of particular legal instruments.
Beyond its practical significance, the history of the human
right of conscientious objection also contributes to our understanding
of the fraught relationship between international human rights law
and national sovereignty.5 Recently, Samuel Moyn’s path-breaking
history of human rights has given vivid expression to the tensions
3.
Previous histories of the human right of conscientious objection neglect
important elements of the story. The two most complete and current works are
Hitomi Takemura, International Human Right of Conscientious Objection to
Military Service and Individual Duties to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders
83–110 (2009) and Michael Hovey, Interceding at the United Nations: The Human
Right of Conscientious Objection, in Transnational Social Movements and Global
Politics 214–24 (Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield & Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997). The
former is a largely doctrinal treatment while the latter slights the pre-1970
history, the crucial role played by anti-colonial politics, and the jurisprudence of
the Human Rights Committee. For earlier treatments, see J.M. Engram,
Conscientious Objection to Military Service: A Report to the United Nations
Division of Human Rights, 12 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 359 (1982); Matthew
Lippman, The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an
International Human Right, 21 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 31 (1990–91); Marie-France
Major, Conscientious Objection to Military Service: The European Commission on
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, 32 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 1 (2001);
Patricia Schaffer & David Weissbrodt, Conscientious Objection to Military Service
as a Human Right, 9 Rev. Int’l Commission Jurists 33 (1972); and David
Weissbrodt, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights Confirms
Conscientious Objection to Military Service as a Human Right, 35 Netherlands
Int’l L. Rev. 53 (1988).
4.
John Fabian Witt, A Social History of International Law: Historical
Commentary, 1861–1900, in International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court:
Continuity and Change 164, 179 (David Sloss, Michael Ramsey & William Dodge
eds., 2011).
5.
For a review of how, in practice, “human rights litigation has
challenged the sovereignty norm,” see William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity:
Challenging the Sovereignty Norm Through Human Rights Litigation,
25 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 261, 263 (2002); see also Louis Henkin,
That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera,
68 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 4 (1999) (characterizing international human rights law as
a “significant erosion of state sovereignty,” a “major rent . . . in the cloak
of sovereignty”).
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inherent in this relationship.6 In Moyn’s account, human rights,
which protect individuals by limiting the sovereign power of
nation-states, are the conceptual and historical antagonists of rights
to self-determination, which authorize groups of people to establish
nation-states and wield sovereign power. Moyn argues that the
modern field of international human rights law could only flourish in
the 1970s after the international legal community grew skeptical of
the anti-colonial movement’s focus on the self-determination and
sovereignty of new African nations.7 Supporting Moyn’s thesis, Jan
Eckel has argued that in those unusual cases where anti-colonial
activists “did base their claims on human rights,” the activists “did
not so much express their commitment to universal norms as
appropriate them for their specific anticolonial policies.”8
On the one hand, the case of conscientious objection confirms
Moyn and Eckel’s theoretical and historical analysis. African nations
at the General Assembly and the Commission of Human Rights
supported a limited, anti-colonial form of conscientious objection, but
resisted the formulation of a universal human right, precisely
because such a right would undermine their own hard-won
sovereignty and endanger their national defense. On the other hand,
the anti-colonial movement and its nationalist outlook played an
essential role in laying the legal groundwork for the universal right of
conscientious objection, good against all nations. In the short term,
then, anti-colonial support for a limited form of conscientious
objection looked like an obstacle to the formulation of a universal

6.
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010);
Samuel Moyn, Imperialism, Self-Determination, and the Rise of Human Rights, in
The Human Rights Revolution: An International History 159–78 (Akira Iriye,
Petra Goedde, & William I. Hitchock eds., 2012).
7.
Moyn, The Last Utopia, supra note 6, at 107, 116–19. For scholarship
supporting Moyn’s conclusions, see Jan Eckel, Human Rights and Decolonization:
New Perspectives and Open Questions, 1 Humanity 111 (2010); Brian Simpson,
“The First Right”: The Carter Administration, Indonesia and the Transnational
Human Rights Politics of the 1970s, in The Human Rights Revolution: An
International History, supra note 6, at 179–200.
8.
Eckel, supra note 7, at 113. For recent scholarship positing a more
harmonious relationship between decolonization and human rights, see Roland
Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (2010);
Fabian Klose, Menschenrechte im Schatten kolonialer Gewalt: Die
Dekolonisierungskriege in Kenia und Algerien 1945–1962 (2009). For a thoughtful
review of the entire historiographical debate, see Frederick Cooper, Afterword:
Social Rights and Human Rights in the Time of Decolonization, 3 Humanity 473
(2012).

756

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[44.3:753

right; in the long term, however, such support became a crucial
source of legitimacy for the universal right.
This process by which the human right of conscientious
objection emerged from the intersection of universalist and nationalist
political projects challenges any sharp opposition between
international law and national sovereignty, human rights and rights
of self-determination. While anti-war activists drew mainly on the
language of individual human rights and anti-colonial activists drew
mainly on the language of national self-determination, both
languages enabled activists—and the conscientious objectors they
championed—to criticize national policies in the name of an
international legal order. Both anti-colonial activists and anti-war
activists wagered that the conscientious objector could become a
vehicle of national transformation, introducing international legal
norms—against militarism and colonialism—into the “national
frame,” the national legal order that often resists but also channels
international reform movements.9 The function of the conscientious
objector was not so much to supplant the national legal order, but to
reform it through appeal to emerging international norms. The
human right of conscientious objection does not then signify the
victory of the international over the national frame, international law
over national sovereignty, but an ongoing negotiation between these
two political and legal orders.10
The Article is organized as follows: Part I recounts the
rejection of a right of conscientious objection during the drafting of
the ICCPR. Part II traces the growth of anti-war advocacy for a right
of conscientious objection. Part III describes the failure of this
advocacy at the Commission of Human Rights in the 1970s and the
emergence of an alternative account of conscientious objection at the
Commission and the General Assembly: conscientious objection as a
9.
See John Fabian Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of
American Law 283–84 (2007). For further analysis of how transnational activists
often “internalize international issues and conflicts into domestic politics,” see
Sidney G. Tarrow’s recent discussion of “rooted cosmopolitanism.” Sidney G.
Tarrow, Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics
181–99 (2012).
10.
Tarrow describes these transnational and national frames as two
co-existing and overlapping societies, “global civil society” and the “society of
states.” Tarrow, supra note 9, at 199. He criticizes studies of transnational
activism that “posit a ‘global civil society’ on the march” without reckoning with
the persistence of “state power.” Id. This Article locates the formation of
international law precisely at the intersection of global civil society and the
society of states.
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tool for resisting putatively illegitimate colonial regimes. Part IV
charts the series of resolutions that, building on this narrow, anticolonial conception of conscientious objection, finally came to identify
conscientious objection as a universal right, good against all nations,
during the late Cold War. As these resolutions made their way
through the Commission on Human Rights in the 1980s and 1990s, a
parallel process took place in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee, a treaty body created by the ICCPR to monitor member
states’ implementation of human rights. Part V tracks the doctrinal
path that led the Human Rights Committee to find—for the first
time—that a nation had violated an individual’s right of conscientious
objection. Part VI concludes.

I. THE ABSENCE OF A RIGHT
In December 1947, a sub-committee of the UN Commission on
Human Rights11 began to draft a bill of rights for the world. Over the
next seven years, this “Drafting Committee” would take up the
question of conscientious objection twice, as social movements in the
United States and Europe reacted to the horrors of the past war and
the possibility of a future, nuclear confrontation. Such mobilization
was far from decisive, however, and conscientious objection failed to
find a place among the hallowed list of human rights.
At its inception, the “Drafting Committee” split into three
separate groups. One group, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, dedicated
itself to drafting a declaration of rights; the second focused on a
legally binding Covenant; the third studied possible methods of
implementing the Covenant once drafted.12 Although the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) passed the General Assembly
(“GA”) a year later, on December 10, 1948, another six years elapsed
before the Commission on Human Rights submitted a draft
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and a separate
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to
the GA in April 1954.13
Over the course of these seven years, conscientious objection
became a subject of debate twice during the drafting of what would
11.
In 2006, the Commission on Human Rights was replaced by the Human
Rights Council. See G.A. Res. 60/251, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
12.
See Marc J. Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights xix (1987); Mary Ann
Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 87 (2002);.
13.
Bossuyt, supra note 12, at xix.
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become Articles 8 and 18 of the ICCPR. Article 8 dealt with slavery
(paragraph 1), servitude (paragraph 2), and other “forced or
compulsory labor” (paragraph 3). The delegates of the Commission on
Human Rights felt that the prohibition on forced or compulsory labor
merited several exceptions. Paragraph 3(c)(ii) treated the exception of
compulsory military service. The initial draft submitted to the third
session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1948 read:
For the purposes of the Article, the term “forced or
compulsory labour” shall not include: (a) Any service
of a purely military character, or service in the case of
conscientious objectors, enacted in virtue of
compulsory military service laws, provided that the
service of conscientious objectors be compensated with
maintenance and pay not inferior to what a soldier of
the lowest rank receives.14
This language assured that neither compulsory military
service nor the alternative service provided by nations to
conscientious objectors would count as prohibited “forced or
compulsory service.” The reference to conscientious objectors,
however, caused displeasure among several delegates, and the
following year changes were made. First, since many countries did
not recognize conscientious objectors at all, the French representative
successfully proposed to add the phrase “in countries where they are
recognized.”15 The Chilean, Egyptian, and Iranian delegates
explained that this amendment was essential; Iran wanted any
mention of conscientious objectors removed.16
Both Eleanor Roosevelt and Charles Malik, the Lebanese
delegate, supported retaining some mention of conscientious
objection. In her comments, Roosevelt suggested that even if a state
did not presently recognize conscientious objectors, it might one day
have to due to changing mores.17 Malik, in turn, warned that “the
concept of the conscientious objector was not a dying tradition but the
beginning of a growing movement.”18 Indeed, as early as July 1947,
14.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 3d Sess., May 24–June 18, 1948,
Annex B: Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, art. 8, § 3, U.N. Doc.
E/800 (June 28, 1948).
15.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 5th Sess., 104th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.104 (May 31, 1949).
16.
See Takemura, supra note 3, at 24.
17.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 5th Sess., 104th mtg, supra note 15,
at 7.
18.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Compilation of Comments on the Draft
International Covenant on Human Rights and the Proposed Additional Articles,
6th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365, at 29 (Mar. 22, 1950).
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Roosevelt had noted throughout the world “a growing feeling of
sympathy towards conscientious objectors.”19
Roosevelt and Malik did not have to be the keenest observers
to notice an increasingly vocal culture of conscientious objection.
Months before Roosevelt mentioned “a growing feeling of sympathy
towards conscientious objectors,” the United States experienced a
nationwide protest against the coming Cold War draft, which would
go into effect in 1948. In New York City, members of the War
Resisters League and allied pacifist organizations burned their draft
cards.20 That same year, the War Resisters International lobbied the
Commission to include a right of conscientious objection in what
would become the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.21 While a
relatively secular, and counter-cultural, anti-war movement
developed in the United States, the resurgence of the Christian
ecumenical movement in Europe created a prestigious platform from
which church leaders called for increased recognition of conscientious
objectors. In the summer of 1948, for instance, the First Assembly of
the World Council of Churches “issued a provisional statement of
principles with respect to conscientious objection.”22 Three years later,
the World Council’s Central Committee would recommend that “[a]
conscientious objector . . . be entitled to exemption from the normal
requirements of the laws of military training and service” and
suggested modes of alternative service.23
Yet the Commission on Human Rights was far from ready to
affirm the goals of this emerging social movement. Although the
Commission did retain a mention of conscientious objection in Article
8, as a non-prohibited mode of compulsory service, it voted down all of
Charles Malik’s further attempts to ensure that those countries that
recognized conscientious objectors treated them “honestly and
sincerely.”24 As Malik’s amendments went down to defeat, however,
Mr. Mendez, the Philippine representative, suggested that
19.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Committee on the
International Bill, 1st Sess., 9th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.9 (June 18,
1947).
20.
See Scott H. Bennett, Radical Pacifism: The War Resisters League and
Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–1963, at 178–79 (2003); Joseph Kip
Kosek, Acts of Conscience: Christian Nonviolence and Modern American
Democracy 197 (2009).
21.
Kosek, supra note 20, at 180.
22.
Schaffer & Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 36.
23.
Id.
24.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Drafting Comm. on the Int’l Bill, 2d
Sess., 24th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.24 (May 14, 1948).
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protections “concerning conscientious objectors might be taken up in
conne[ction] with article 16 [later article 18], which dealt with the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”25 Mendez followed his
own advice later in the spring. During discussion of what was then
labeled Article 16 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion”26), Mendez introduced an amendment:
“Persons who conscientiously object to war as being contrary to their
religion shall be exempt from military service.”27
Confronted by a total lack of support for this proposal,
however, Mendez would quickly withdraw his conscientious objection
amendment. The Chilean representative was first to comment,
explaining that while he “appreciated the respectful sentiments for
freedom of conscience which had prompted the Philippine
Government to propose” the amendment, he “found it impossible to
accept.”28 “It was inadmissible,” the Chilean explained, “that anyone,
albeit with the highest intentions, should fail to participate in
the duties to be performed for the community.”29 Though
Eleanor Roosevelt “expressed the complete sympathy of her
delegation” with the amendment, she explained that such a provision
was “outside the scope of article 16,” and, furthermore, that it was
“questionable whether a specific provision of that nature should
be included in a general convention of fundamental human
rights.”30 Both the representatives of the United Kingdom and
Australia, while emphasizing that their countries did recognize
conscientious objectors, agreed with Roosevelt that the amendment
was “out of place.”31
The drafting history of Articles 8 and 18 of the ICCPR leave
little doubt that most Commission delegates were strongly opposed to
creating a right of conscientious objection. It would be nearly two
decades before the United Nations would reconsider the right, when a
groundswell of protest against the Vietnam War coincided with new
efforts to instantiate an international human rights regime.

25.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 142nd mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.142 (Mar. 31, 1950).
26.
Bossuyt, supra note 12, at 356.
27.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 161st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.161 (Apr. 28, 1950).
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 12.
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II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT
In the wake of World War II, the major pre-war peace
organizations lay in tatters.32 While during the early ICCPR drafting
sessions, Roosevelt and Malik had noticed growing sympathy for
conscientious objection, international activism was impeded both by
residual wartime suspicions and new Cold War tensions.33
Nonetheless, in 1949, the International Liaison Committee of
Organizations for Peace (“ILCOP”) formed as an umbrella
organization that included most of the major anti-war groups,
including the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Friends
World Committee for Consultation, and War Resisters
International.34 Between the late 1940s and 1963, the focus of ILCOP
and other anti-war organizations was the pursuit of “nuclear peace.”35
However, after the ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty
between the USA, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom,
attention shifted to Vietnam as Lyndon Johnson, the former “peace
candidate,” pursued a strategy of escalation.36 The peace movement’s
increasingly bold denunciations of American strategy in Vietnam
coincided with a renewed emphasis on human rights at the United
Nations, as the organization declared 1968 to be the “Year of Human
Rights.” In this international climate, the peace movement brought to
the United Nations its vision of a human right of conscientious
objection—a right grounded in the individual conscience that gave
each citizen the authority to judge the legality of his nation’s foreign
policy and to decide whether or not to serve in his nation’s military.
In 1964, ILCOP became the International Peace Bureau (“IPB”) and,
in 1965, the IPB’s first annual conference called upon the United
States “to stop immediately bombing and other military action in
North Vietnam” and “to declare publicly its willingness to enter into
negotiations with all parties concerned, including the National
Liberation Front, and for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces
from Vietnam.”37 Two years later, the 1967 annual conference was
32.
See Elise Boulding, Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History
64–65 (2001).
33.
See Hovey, supra note 3, at 220–21, for a discussion of the obstacle that
“East/West” rivalries posed for conscientious objection advocates.
34.
See Rainer Santi, 100 Years of Peace Making: A History of the
International Peace Bureau and Other International Peace Movement
Organisations and Networks 36–37 (1991).
35.
See Lawrence Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace
Movement, 1933-1984, at 133 (1984).
36.
Id. at 280–82.
37.
Santi, supra note 34, at 48–49.
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dedicated to Vietnam, and 430 delegates from sixty-three countries
came together to discuss the ongoing war.
Meanwhile, the IPB’s Executive Committee decided that the
1968 annual conference should focus on a more tactical topic, the
“Right to Refuse Military Service and Orders.” This “Right to Refuse”
conference would coincide with the United Nations’ declared
International Year of Human Rights,38 and would follow on the heels
of the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran, which
was scheduled for late April. Whereas the 1967 IPB conference took
the form of a protest against Vietnam, the United Nations’ 1968 focus
on human rights offered a more concrete direction for the IPB’s own
work. The conference topic, a right to refuse military service,
articulated the peace movement’s goal—an end to war—in the
burgeoning language of international legal rights.
The IPB delegates met at Reutlingen, Federal Republic of
Germany in August 1968. A working paper produced in preparation
for the conference, The Right to Refuse Military Service and Orders
(“The Right to Refuse”), profoundly influenced their talks.39 Ulrich
Herz, the IPB’s Secretary General, had himself edited The Right to
Refuse, which was written mainly in Geneva in March 1968.40
Members of Amnesty International, the War Resisters League, and
the Friends World Committee for Consultation all participated in the
drafting process. The Right to Refuse described itself not as a protest
against state power but as the beginning of a dialogue about
international human rights:
The International Peace Burea[u] has initiated this
Study as its contribution to the International Human
Rights Year. . . . The Study, therefore, should not be
considered as a political programme for Pacifists to
put before their Governments. The main intention is,
rather to stimulate further discussion on the
implementation of Human Rights regarding
conscientious objection.41
38.
See G.A. Res. 2217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2217 (Dec. 19, 1966).
39.
See International Peace Bureau, The Right to Refuse Military Service
and Orders: A Working Paper Prepared for the International Peace Bureau
Conference in Reutlingen/Stuttgart, Germany, 25th–30th August 1968
[hereinafter International Peace Bureau, The Right to Refuse Military Service].
40.
International Peace Bureau, The Right to Refuse to Kill: A New Guide
to Conscientious Objection and Service Refusal, in 1 Human Rights: International
Documents, at 1681 (James Avery Joyce ed. 1978).
41.
International Peace Bureau, The Right to Refuse Military Service, supra
note 39, at 4–5.
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By focusing on implementation and legalization “within the
ideological framework” of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the IPB acknowledged that it was breaking with certain
constituencies within the peace moment: “That the Study is
concentrated on the legal aspect of the problem of conscientious
objection, especially on the ‘technical’ question of recognition, may
seem unsatisfactory to some individual conscientious objectors, who
consider their objection primarily as a personal testimony. . . .”42 The
working paper also emphasized that its commitment to international
legal recognition of conscientious objection was not meant to
antagonize national legal and political stability. International
recognition of conscientious objection would mediate “the conflict
between the individual conscience and the claim of the State,” not
simply render the State a vassal to the individual conscience or its
international protectors.43 The authors went on to contrast their
vision of the conscientious objector, who balanced national interests
with international ones, with the traditional conscientious objector,
who subordinated political interests to divine ones. While the
traditional objector rejected all wars because of his allegiance to the
“Kingdom of God,” the modern objector recognized that the “kingdom
of men” is “a complex and relative order which in itself contains a
plurality of loyalties. . . .”44 The authors’ prime example of the
“complex and relative order” of the “Kingdom of Men” was the
Charter of the United Nations and its qualified condemnation of war:
[W]ar is condemned in principle as a means of
solving international conflicts. According to the same
Charter, however, the United Nations itself is entitled
to secure peace. . . . In line with the spirit and the
letter of the Charter an individual conscientious
reaction could be envisaged, involving a refusal of
military in the specific conditions of national or allied
contingents, but at the same time expressing a
willingness to serve, if required, in military forces
under the authority of the United Nations.45
According to the IPB, then, a selective conscientious
objector—one who objected to some, not all wars—might be the
perfect individual embodiment of the Charter’s distinction between
wars of national interest and wars to keep the peace. Yet, the
authors had to note that “the United Nations has not, so far, taken
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
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any decision which expressly promotes the idea of conscientious
objection.”46
At the Reutlingen Conference, committees drew on The Right
to Refuse working paper to produce materials for a potential
international convention on conscientious objection. The next
summer, at Kungälv, Sweden, the annual 1969 IPB conference
focused on turning those committee reports into a draft “Convention
on the Right to Refuse to Participate in Armed Conflicts” and a draft
UN resolution calling for the UN Secretary-General to conduct
further research into the question of a right of conscientious
objection.47 These documents also reflected the vision of conscientious
objection first developed in Right to Refuse.48 They only awaited
adoption by IPB’s member organizations, which would meet again in
August 1970 at Driebergen, Holland.
The year 1970 was a bonanza for international conscientious
conversation. On March 16, 1970, Eileen Egan, a representative of
the Catholic peace organization Pax Christi, called on the
Commission of Human Rights to take up the topic of conscientious
objection. Pax Christi, which held consultative status at the
Commission, had begun a “Right of Conscience” campaign to protest
the Vietnam War in 1968 and now, two years later, it was setting its
sights on the United Nations.49 While the Commission took no action
on Egan’s statement, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador, Jamal Baroody,
was moved by her presentation, and would introduce the topic of
conscientious objection at the Third Committee of the GA later
that year.50
Before he could do so, however, the United Nations organized
a June conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on the role of youth in
human rights.51 Here, divisions began to appear between anti-war
46.
Id. at 53.
47.
International Peace Bureau, The Right to Refuse Military Service, supra
note 39, at 1681–82.
48.
See id.; Santi, supra note 34, at 41.
49.
See Eileen Egan, The Struggle of the Small Vehicle, Pax, in American
Catholic Pacifism: The Influence of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker
Movement 123, 138–43 (Annie Klejment & Nancy L. Roberts eds., 1996).
50.
The most likely reason for Saudi Arabia’s favorable stance on
conscientious objection is that it was the only major country in its region not to
have a policy of compulsory military service. The armies of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and
Israel were all raised by conscription. See Robert Sullivan, Saudi Arabia in
International Politics, 32 Rev. Pol. 436, 449–51 (1970).
51.
See The Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Seminar Organized by the United Nations Division of Human Rights in
Co-operation with the Government of Yugoslavia at Belgrade Yugoslavia, 2-12
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and anti-colonial activists. While “[s]ome participants vigorously
advocated for the recognition of th[e] right [of conscientious
objection],” others insisted upon a distinction between refusal to serve
“in aggressive or imperialist wars” and the refusal to “bear arms
and fight for just causes, including in particular the defence of
their country.”52
This division between peace and anti-colonial activism grew
more visible at the inaugural UN World Youth Assembly, held the
next month in New York City. The Assembly’s final report stated that
“[c]onscientious objection should be treated as a human right” and
placed the subject “on the agenda of the next . . . session of the UN
Commission on Human Rights.”53 Yet the Assembly’s “Message” did
not itself call for such a right. Indeed, the “Message” affirmed both
the Assembly’s “decision . . . to fight for the elimination of the danger
of a third world war and to safeguard world peace,” and its “full
solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin
America and with all the people which fight against imperialism,
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and for liberty and independence.”54 The
Message also announced the Assembly’s “solidarity with the people
and youth of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in demanding immediate
cessation of American aggression . . . and the recognition of the right
of the peoples of the Indo-Chinese peninsula to decide their own
destiny without foreign interference.”55 The relationship between
world peace and armed, anti-colonial resistance that structured the
1970 World Youth Assembly Message would become increasingly
complex over the next decade, as anti-Vietnam outrage mingled with
post-colonial ambition.
In August 1970, a month after the World Youth Assembly, the
IPB met in Driebergen. There, the organization finally adopted a
Draft Convention and Resolution on conscientious objection and
called on “national peace organizations to urge their governments to
submit the . . . draft resolution to the forthcoming General Assembly
of the United Nations.”56 Seán MacBride, the new IPB chairman,
June 1970, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/39 (1970), in The International Law of Youth
Rights: Source Documents and Commentary 266 (William D. Angel ed., 1995)
[hereinafter International Law of Youth Rights].
52.
Id. at 281.
53.
Schaffer and Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 34.
54.
World Youth Assembly, United Nations Headquarters, New York, July
9–17, 1970, WYA Doc. No. 56/WYA/P/10 (1970), in International Law of Youth
Rights, supra note 51, at 609–10.
55.
Id.
56.
International Peace Bureau, supra note 40, at 1681–82.
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former Irish Foreign Minister, and soon-to-be Nobel Peace Prize
Winner, introduced the draft Resolution and Convention by outlining
the legal ambitions of the anti-war movement.57
At the heart of MacBride’s vision stood the figure of the
conscientious objector who, MacBride believed, could become a
primary conduit for the enactment of an international legal order
dedicated to peace.58 Reviewing legal or quasi-legal precedents that
formed the basis for an effective peace campaign, MacBride insisted
that the UN Charter “virtually outlaws war and certainly forbids ‘the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.’”59 Most importantly, however, these
prohibitions reached individuals, not just states. MacBride explained
that in accordance with the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, embraced by the UN General Assembly in
December 1946, criminal liability for the violation of international
law attached to individuals, whether conscript or volunteer, even if
they were acting under orders.60 Consequently, each individual was
legally obligated to make a choice against war. Conversely, the
integrity of international prohibitions on war-making depended on
the “moral choice” of the individual.61
The next month, the topic of conscientious objection arose at
the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Back in 1968, the
International Conference on Human Rights at Tehran had called for
the “education of youth in the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”62 And in 1970, the General Assembly had put
the topic of “Youth, its education in the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, its problems and needs, and its participation
in national development” on the Third Committee’s agenda.63 Earlier
that spring, the Saudi Arabian delegate Jamal Baroody had been
impressed with Pax Christi’s call for a right of conscientious objection
at the Commission on Human Rights, and in the context of the topic
of “Youth,” he introduced a resolution that called on member states
57.
Seán MacBride, A New Dimension to the Legal and Moral Right to
Refuse Military Service and Orders, in International Peace Bureau, supra note 40,
at 1663–74.
58.
Id. at 1669.
59.
Id. at 1666 (quoting U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4).
60.
Id. at 1666–70.
61.
Id. at 1669.
62.
Final Act of the Int’l Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22–May 13,
1968, Tehran Int’l Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968).
63.
See Takemura, supra note 3, at 30.
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“[n]ot to conscript arbitrarily any youth to join the armed forces of his
country.”64 After this first proposal failed, Baroody put forward a
revised resolution, calling on member states “[n]ot to punish any
youth who refuses to join the armed forces of his country if such
youth conscientiously objects to being involved in war. . . .”65 When
Baroody encountered continued resistance from several delegates, he
requested that the text of his draft resolution simply be forwarded to
the Commission on Human Rights for further consideration.
Although Baroody was defeated at the Third Committee, his action
ensured that a generally applicable “human right of conscientious
objection to military service” would appear on the Commission’s
agenda the following year.66
Before the Third Committee adjourned, however, the delegate
from the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic appended an
amendment to another draft resolution on the question of youth and
human rights. Rather than endorsing a universal right of
conscientious objection on the basis of individual conscience, the
Byelorussian amendment encouraged something akin to selective
conscientious objection in the interests of national self-determination.
[The Third Committee] [c]onsiders it important that
young people of all countries of the world should
resolutely oppose military and other action designed
to suppress the liberation movements of peoples still
under colonial, racist, or alien domination and under
military occupation, and should support those peoples
in every way possible in conformity with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
the decisions of United Nations organs recognizing
the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples for their
freedom and independence, in their efforts to attain
independence in accordance with the inalienable right
of self-determination.67
This proposal resolved the tension inherent in the World
Youth Assembly’s call for both a right of conscientious objection and
solidarity in the fight for self-determination by implicitly endorsing
conscientious objection only in those cases where one’s country was
engaged in the suppression of liberation movements. Yet while the
language of conscientious objection had a non-violent sensibility, the
language of “resolute opposition” could well include violent means.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Takemura, supra note 3, at 31 (quoting Baroody).
Id.
See Hovey, supra note 3, at 217–18.
G.A. Res. 2633 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8149 (Nov. 11, 1970).
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With the Soviet and African blocs in the majority and the Western
nations in opposition, the Third Committee added this amendment to
the draft resolution.68 Soon after, the General Assembly passed a
resolution including this language.69
The geopolitical wrangling that embroiled the Third
Committee in September 1970 resulted in nothing like the
unqualified endorsement of a right of conscientious objection that
anti-war organizations such as Pax Christi and the IPB supported.
Indeed, the Byelorussian amendment presaged the rise of an
alternative account of conscientious objection grounded in anticolonial politics. But such an anti-colonial model of conscientious
objection would gain traction at the Commission on Human Rights
only after the defeat of the anti-war vision.
In March 1971, members of the Commission from Austria,
Chile, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Uruguay finally got the
opportunity to propose a version of the IPB’s Resolution on
conscientious objection. In its preliminary paragraphs, the draft
Resolution observed “the widespread violence and brutality of our
era,” and pointed to several normative sources to contextualize the
intent of its operative paragraphs.70 These normative sources were
the “Principles of International Law known as the Nuremberg
Principles formulated by the International Law Commission in July
1950 at the request of the General Assembly,” “Article 18 of the
[UDHR], and Article 18 of the [ICCPR,] which assure the right to
manifest in practice and observance a conscientiously-held belief,”
and “Resolution 337 adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe,” which in 1967 had called for pan-European
recognition of a right of conscientious objection.71
The draft Resolution requested that the Secretary-General
“undertake the preparation of a [s]tudy” to determine the treatment
of conscientious objectors by the United Nations’ member states, “the
extent to which objectors of conscience who decline to do military
service could be offered by the United Nations opportunities to
perform duties in the furtherance of peace,” and “the minimum
protection which should be extended to objectors of conscience under
national and international law.”72 In introducing a version of this
68.
Takemura, supra note 3, at 32.
69.
Id.
70.
International Peace Bureau, supra note 40, at 1682–83.
71.
Id. at 1683; see also Eur. Consult. Ass., Right of Conscientious
Objection, 18th Sess., Res. 337, at 1 (Jan. 26, 1967).
72.
International Peace Bureau, supra note 40, at 1683.

2013]

The Invention of a Human Right

769

Resolution to the Commission on Human Rights, the delegate from
the Netherlands explained that at stake was “the right of every
individual to refuse to perform military service on the grounds of
conscience.”73 He acknowledged that the resolution “raise[d] the issue
of the security of States and the relationship between the State and
the individual.”74
Debate
over
the
Resolution
would
pit
Western
representatives, supportive of the universalistic language and
skeptical of the absolute prerogatives of state sovereignty,75 against
members from the Soviet and African blocs. These members, echoing
the position that their nations had taken at the Third Committee the
previous fall, explained they would not tolerate any international
regulation of conscientious objection, but encouraged individuals “to
object on grounds of conscience to wars unjustly undertaken by their
governments, such as wars of aggression and colonialist oppression.”76
To those representatives for whom “defense of one’s country
was not a matter of freedom of conscience” and who believed that “one
who refused to bear arms could be considered only an unethical
coward,”77 Sir Keith Unwin, the UK representative, responded: “The
right of self-defense was of course universally recognized, but the
United Nations was an organization created in the interests of peace,
and young people who objected to compulsory military service on
conscientious grounds were taking those ideas a step further.”78 But
the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic found
such paeans to peace suspect, speculating that it was “perhaps in the
interests of the wealthy countries that the Draft resolution on
conscientious objection should be adopted, since these countries could
always recruit mercenaries. . . .”79 Several developing countries
noted that “their countries were in no position to allow such an
exemption, given their vulnerable political status and inferior level of
economic development.”80
In reaction to this debate, the sponsors significantly watered
down their proposal. They removed the more polemical preambular
73.
Takemura, supra note 3, at 35–36.
74.
Id. at 36.
75.
Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 27th Sess., Feb. 22–Mar.
26, 1971, at 48, U.N. Doc. E/4949, E/CN.4/1068 (1971) [hereinafter UNCHR Rep.
of the 27th Sess.].
76.
Id.
77.
Engram, supra note 3, at 362.
78.
Takemura, supra note 3, at 37 (quoting Unwin).
79.
Id.
80.
Engram, supra note 3, at 362.
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paragraphs of the IPB resolution. Now, the resolution only referred to
Articles 18 and 3 of the Universal Declaration (protecting the right to
life, liberty and security), not the versions of those Articles included
in the binding ICCPR. The operative paragraphs requested that the
Secretary General gather information from Member States on the
nature of their military service laws and file a report with the
Commission.81 On March 19, 1971, this anodyne resolution passed by
a vote of eighteen to three with seven abstentions.82
In January 1973, the Commission on Human Rights received
the Secretary-General’s report. Three months later, the World
Council of Churches submitted to the Commission a “Statement on
the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service” that
called for immediate action. Noting “growing concern in the world’s
religious communities that young people who refuse to participate in
a war on conscientious grounds should not be penalized for their
moral stand,” the WCC urged the Commission to “recommend to the
United Nations General Assembly the adoption of a declaration
recognizing conscientious objection to military service as a valid
expression of the right of freedom of conscience” under Article 18 of
the ICCPR.83 Yet support at the Commission for a general right of
conscientious objection remained weak. While anti-war organizations
with consultative status at the Commission continued to lobby
potentially sympathetic delegates, the next six years brought
deadlock and deferral of the issue.84

III. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE ANTI-COLONIAL
MOVEMENT
Although 1973 was not an auspicious year for conscientious
objection at the Commission of Human Rights, it was a crucial year
for the history of conscientious objection in other respects, as the two
competing approaches to a right of conscientious objection came to a
81.
Id.
82.
See Hovey, supra note 3, at 218.
83.
World Council of Churches, The Churches in International Affairs:
Reports 1970–1973, at 136, 138 (1974).
84.
International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51, at 26 (showing the
deferral of the conscientious objection question in 1974 and 1975); U.N. Comm’n
on Human Rights, The Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 32nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1/XXXII (Feb. 11, 1976) (noting the
unresolved debate between countries supporting a general right of conscientious
objection and countries rejecting such a right as injurious to their basic military
needs in 1976); Takemura, supra note 3, at 39 (deferral of conscientious objection
question in 1977, 1978, and 1979).
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head. A month after the World Council of Churches (“WCC”) called on
the Commission of Human Rights to recognize a universal right of
conscientious objection, the joint UN/Organization of African Unity
(“OAU”) conference on Southern Africa proposed an alternative
approach. While the WCC had envisioned conscientious objection as a
right that could be exercised by the citizens of every nation in the
interests of peace, the UN/OAU discussions at Oslo supported a
different vision of conscientious objection: as a tactical and legal
technology specifically suited to resisting colonial regimes on the
basis of the illegality of those regimes’ foreign and domestic policy.
Both approaches saw the conscientious objector as a vehicle for the
fulfillment of international law, but their different ideological
programs had generated different ideal objectors.
In his report on the “armed struggle of the liberation
movements . . . against
Portuguese
domination
in
Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau,” the Dutch anti-apartheid activist
Sietse Bosgra argued that international law created a legal duty to
aid those who resisted military service in apartheid regimes. He
declared that the “best support we can give the victims of apartheid
and colonialism is to cooperate in dislodging the oppressor by
supporting these liberation movements.”85 Pursuant to this
conclusion, Bosgra explained that “[d]esertion from the Portuguese
army or refusal to be enlisted should be considered a positive
contribution to the struggle against Portuguese colonialism.”86
Although Bosgra did not speak of a “right” to conscientious objection,
he did suggest that support for anti-apartheid objectors could be
grounded in other forms of international law: the law of war as
embodied in the UN Charter and the law of refugees. Explaining that
“[f]oreign support to deserters and objectors is imperative because of
the absolutely illegal nature of the Portuguese occupation,” Bosgra
recommended that “countries of Western Europe should acknowledge
the conscientious objectors and deserters as political refugees without
restrictions,” and pointed to the status given such objectors by the
Danish government as a “model.”87 Later that year, the General
Assembly passed the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.88 This convention
85.
Sietse Bosgra, Territories Under Portuguese Domination: Proposals for
Action, in The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo, 9–14 April, 1973:
Papers and Documents 79 (Olav Stokke & Carl Gösta Widstrand eds., 1973).
86.
Id. at 87.
87.
Id. at 87–88.
88.
G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/9030, at 75 (1974).
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attached individual criminal liability to those who “‘participate in’ the
crime of apartheid.”89 In doing so, it implied the existence of a legal
duty—if not yet a legal right—to refuse to cooperate with conscription
policies in apartheid countries.
Five years later, in 1978, the General Assembly passed a
resolution that would have lasting repercussions for the human right
of conscientious objection, tying the cause of conscientious objection to
the groundswell of opposition to apartheid. Taking the 1973
Convention as its foundation, the 1978 resolution recognized “the
right of all persons to refuse service in military or police forces which
are used to enforce apartheid.”90 Echoing Bosgra’s 1973
recommendations, the 1978 resolution called upon member states “to
grant asylum or safe transit . . . to persons compelled to leave their
country of nationality solely because of a conscientious objection to
assisting in the enforcement of apartheid through service in military
or police forces.”91 Strikingly, the resolution cited Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a reason that member
nations should recognize the legitimacy of anti-apartheid
conscientious objectors.92 In 1980, the General Assembly issued
another resolution, calling “all governments and organisations to
assist persons compelled to leave South Africa because of their
objection, on grounds of conscience, to serving in its military or
police force.”93
Despite the limited conception of a right of conscientious
objection endorsed by the GA resolutions, they laid the foundation for
later declarations of a more general right.94 Indeed, at the height of
anti-apartheid fever at the GA, the Commission on Human Rights
took up the question of conscientious objection anew. On March 12,
1980, the representative from the Netherlands introduced a
resolution asking the Secretary-General for current information on
national conscientious objection policies. In introducing this
resolution, the Dutch representative pointed to the facts that “of
about 90 countries with compulsory military service, 37 made some
89.
Lyal Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious
Human Rights Violations 77 (1992).
90.
G.A. Res. 33/165, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc.
A/33/45, at 154 (1978).
91.
Id. ¶ ¶ 2–3.
92.
Id.
93.
G.A. Res. 39/72A, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 42 (Dec. 13, 1984).
94.
The laying of this foundation was not accidental. The 1978 resolution
was drafted by the Quaker United Nations Office, a long-term proponent of the
general right of conscientious objection. See Hovey, supra note 3, at 221.
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legislative or administrative provision for conscientious objectors,”
and that “[b]road public support for recognition of conscientious
objectors appeared to be growing.”95 Though some representatives
resisted the resolution, it eventually passed. The resolution’s
preamble referred to the 1978 General Assembly Resolution, “which
recognized the right of all persons to refuse service in military or
police forces used to enforce apartheid.”96
The next year, the Commission on Human Rights’
Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
requested a new study on conscientious objection. The members of the
Sub-Commission chosen to draft the study, Asbjørn Eide and Charna
L. C. Mubanga-Chipoya, submitted a preliminary report in
September 1982, and Resolution 1982/30 requested a final version.
The preamble of this Resolution acknowledged the difference between
the right promulgated in the General Assembly’s 1978 resolution and
a universal right of conscientious objection:
Recognizing the right of all persons to refuse
service in military or police forces which are used to
enforce apartheid, to pursue wars of aggression, or to
engage in any other illegal warfare;
Recognizing the possibility of the right of all
persons to refuse service in military or police forces on
grounds of conscience or deeply held personal
conviction. . . .97
Unlike the right of conscientious objection promulgated by the
1978 GA resolution, the right contemplated in paragraph (b) would be
a right good against any citizen’s home state. Even paragraph (a) was
somewhat novel, as it expanded the limited right recognized in 1978
to cover not just apartheid regimes but all “wars of aggression” and
“other illegal warfare.” The Sub-Commission thus suggested that
“conscience” might become a vehicle through which individuals could
give voice to a panoply of international legal norms. Eide and
Mubanga-Chipoya’s report elaborated such a vision, explaining that
for “a conscientious person, human rights provisions would be among
95.
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Discussion of Agenda Item 17,
36th Sess. (Mar. 12, 1980), in International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51,
at 318.
96.
E.S.C. Res. 38 (XXXVI), 36 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc.
E/1980/13, E/CN.4/1408, at 198 (Mar. 12, 1980).
97.
Asbjørn Eide & Charna L. C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Conscientious
Objection to Military Service, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30/Rev.1, U.N. Sales
No. E.85.XIV.1, at 1 (1985).
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the central norms that would guide him in determining the dividing
line between legitimate and illegitimate taking of the life of others.”98
If Eide and Mubango-Chipoya had their way, not only would
conscience suffice to justify objection to compulsory service under
international law, but the conscientious objector could himself become
an enforcer of international law.
The authors went on to make a series of recommendations
that went far beyond the limited 1978 right to conscientiously object
to participation in apartheid. They proposed a draft Resolution for the
Commission of Human Rights, which would declare that “States
should recognize by law the right of persons who, for reasons of
conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical,
moral, humanitarian, or similar motives, refuse to perform armed
service, to be released from the obligation to perform military
service.”99 This right would be available to citizens who objected
either to all armed service or to armed service “which the objector
considers likely” to violate international laws against apartheid,
genocide, and illegal occupation of foreign territory, among other
crimes.100 This new right would require national enforcement
regimes. Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya’s draft Resolution called on
states to “maintain or establish independent decision-making
bodies to determine whether a conscientious objection is valid
under national law” and to establish alternative forms of service
for objectors.101
In making these recommendations, Eide and MubangaChipoya drew liberally on the working papers produced at the height
of the Vietnam conflict by non-governmental organizations such as
the International Peace Bureau.102 It was the issue of apartheid,
however, that had made these documents newly accessible, opening
up common ground between Western activists dedicated to world
peace and Soviet, Arab, and African member states wary of Western
rights talk and protective of their rights of self-determination. Indeed,
one of the seven legal sources for a right of conscientious objection
that Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya identified was “self-determination”:
Objection to participation in armed repression of selfdetermination will no doubt be particularly strong in
the case of individuals who belong to a people whose
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 9.
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self-determination is denied. Resistance by the young
people of Namibia and South Africa to military service
in the South African-controlled armed forces provides
an example of such a case.103
Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya’s reasoning helps explain why
the first official formulations of a right of conscientious objection at
the UN arrived via anti-colonial politics. In the case of apartheid at
least, the conscientious objector and the legitimate sovereign are one
and the same, as the true popular sovereigns are disempowered by
the compulsory mechanisms of illegitimate rulers. In such a case,
Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya suggested, the conscientious objector
could act as a conduit for both legitimate national self-determination
and the international order that prohibits the domination of a people
by an alien force. In the apartheid struggle, then, the nationalistic
violence of liberation and the internationally-minded non-violence
of conscientious objection achieved an original and politically
potent synthesis.
In the spring of 1984, the Commission on Human Rights
asked the Economic and Social Council to give Eide and
Mubanga-Chipoya’s report the “widest possible distribution” and
ECOSOC complied.104 Thus, substantial momentum preceded the
Commission’s 1985 meeting when, in addition to Eide and
Mubanga-Chipoya’s report, the Commission heard testimony from
several non-governmental organizations including the International
Peace Bureau, the International Commission of Jurists, Pax Christi,
and Amnesty International.105 The first movers at the Commission,
however, were several Soviet bloc countries who submitted two
superficial resolutions emphasizing “the important role of young
people in the struggle for peace and international co-operation” while
studiously avoiding the question of conscientious objection.106 The
cocktail of conscientious objection and self-determination offered by
Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya’s report might have been strong enough
to attract African and Arab support, but Soviet suspicion of Western
interference could still spoil the party.
103.
Id. at 6–7.
104.
See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Resolution on
Conscientious Objection to Military Service, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/L.33/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 1985), in International Law of Youth Rights,
supra note 51, at 330–331.
105.
Id. at 325.
106.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Resolution on Conscientious
Objection to Military Service, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/L.32 (Feb. 27,
1985), in International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51, at 328.
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On February 27, 1985, Austria, Costa Rica, the Netherlands,
and Spain submitted their own resolution. It squarely addressed the
issue of conscientious objection while recalling in its preamble the
1978 General Assembly resolution and Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya’s
report. The draft Resolution’s first operative paragraph declared “that
the right of conscientious objection to military service is a legitimate
exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.”107 The
resolution went on to request states to “reconsider their legislation or
administrative arrangements with a view to recognizing the right of
persons who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction, refuse
to perform armed service to be released from the obligation to
perform military service.”108
The Commission deferred consideration of this contentious
draft, and on March 13, the original drafters, now joined by
France and the United Kingdom, submitted a revised version
which eliminated the phrase “the right of conscientious objection”
and simply stated “that conscientious objection to military service is
a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion.”109 This revision did not quiet the qualms of
the Soviet-aligned countries. Bulgaria introduced a series of
amendments, one of which replaced the first operative paragraph
which “[c]onsiders that conscientious objection to military service,
when exercised in accordance with national legislation, can be
construed as an expression of the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.”110 This amendment sought to vitiate the very
concept of an international right of conscientious objection by defining
the expression of the right to freedom of conscience in terms of
obedience to a nation’s positive law.
Realizing that passage was not in the cards, the
representative from the Netherlands moved to adjourn debate on the

107.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Resolution, 41st Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1985/L.33 (Feb. 27, 1985), in International Law of Youth Rights,
supra note 51, at 330.
108.
Id.
109.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/L.33/Rev.1,
supra note 104, at 332.
110.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/L.60 (Mar.
13, 1985) in International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51, at 333.
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resolution for two years.111 As David Weissbrodt has argued, this
particular two-year window may have been absolutely crucial.112 In
1986, the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, among other events,
accelerated reform within the USSR and the international thawing of
the Cold War.113

IV. UNIVERSALIZING THE RIGHT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
At the Commission on Human Right’s 1987 meeting, the
Western sponsors of an updated resolution on conscientious objection
engaged in productive talks with presumed opponents such as
Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, and Tanzania. These
talks sought to resolve residual Cold War and anticolonial tensions.
First, the Byelorussian delegates wanted to include language
referencing the “New International Economic Order,” a theory of
global development supported by the Soviet bloc.114 The United
States, however, had developed a practice of dissenting or abstaining
from any resolution that invoked the phrase.115
Second, the delegate from Tanzania threatened to use his
influence to turn the African bloc against the proposal if Austria,
Australia, Ireland, and Norway did not relent in attempting to
narrow a recent Congolese resolution on mercenaries.116 Although the
Western nations refused to withdraw their amendments, these
amendments were defeated and Tanzania ultimately did not oppose
the conscientious objection resolution.117 The Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic and its bloc would eventually abstain, rather than
dissent, after several further concessions on the part of the
pro-conscientious-objection sponsors.118
Prior to the vote on the resolution, Christian Strohal, the
alternative representative from Austria, emphasized that, unlike the
1985 resolution, this new draft “did not touch on any national
111.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Discussion of Agenda Item 15, 41st
Sess. (Mar. 14, 1985), in International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51,
at 334.
112.
Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 54–56.
113.
See Boris Kagarlitsky, Perestroika: The Dialectic of Change, in The
New Detente: Rethinking East-West Relations 323, 333 (Mary Kaldor, Gerald
Holden & Richard A. Falk eds., 1989).
114.
Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 56.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 59.
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prerogatives” nor “infringe on the rights of countries which have
compulsory military service,” including Austria itself.119 Indeed, the
resolution merely “recommended that such countries introduce
various forms of alternative service,” while referring deferentially to
“national legal systems.”120
Despite these concessions, a few more were needed before
passage could be secured. These final alterations appealed to those
states still anxious about the prerogatives of national sovereignty:
drafters added a reference to the “right to self-determination” in a
preambular paragraph and changed the phrase “take measures
aimed at recognizing the right to be exempt from military service” to
“take measures aimed at exemption from military service.”121 Indeed,
the resolution’s sponsors had purged it of any explicit mention of a
right of conscientious objection; explicit articulation of the right would
have to wait two more years. Nonetheless, when Resolution 1987/46
finally passed on March 10, 1987, the Commission on Human Rights
for the first time endorsed conscientious objection to military service
as a practice in which all citizens might engage, not just those
engaged in resistance to colonial or neo-colonial regimes.122 Only Iraq
and Mozambique dissented.
Two years later, the Commission on Human Rights finally
declared the existence of a general right of conscientious objection. It
was the first time in the UN’s history that any charter or treaty body
had done so. On March 8, 1989, the Commission issued a resolution
on conscientious objection that explicitly recognized “the right of
everyone to have conscientious objections to military service as a
legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. . . .”123 In doing so, the Commission dedicated a preambular
paragraph to the General Assembly’s 1978 anti-apartheid resolution,
acknowledging the ground that struggles for national liberation and
self-determination had laid for the novel right.
Between 1989 and 1992, former Soviet bloc countries Poland
and Hungary recognized the right of conscientious objection and

119.
Id. at 57–58.
120.
Id.
121.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Discussion of Agenda Item 15, 42nd
Sess. (Mar. 10, 1987), in International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51, at 339.
122.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1987/46, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1987/L.73 (Mar. 10 1987).
123.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1989/59, 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1989/59 (Mar. 8, 1989) (emphasis added).
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began to offer non-military alternative service.124 Meanwhile, the
Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on “Human
Rights and Youth” lamented that many parts of the world were
falling short of the standards set by the Commission’s 1989
resolution.125 The breadth of the Special Rapporteur’s list—which
included both states perennially ravaged by war and those pacific
enclaves which had most fully supported the declaration of a right of
conscientious objection—indicated how relatively ambitious the
standards set out in the 1987 and 1989 resolutions were. This gap
between resolution and reality also indicated the great distance
between the declaration of a right and the curing of its violation.
As the Commission on Human Rights turned in earnest to the
question of conscientious objection in the 1980s, another UN body,
specifically authorized to hear individual complaints about human
rights violations, began to develop a conscientious objection
jurisprudence. In 1976, two years before the General Assembly
recognized a limited right of conscientious objection, the ratification
of the ICCPR had led to the creation of a Human Rights
Committee.126 The function of the HRC was to review the compliance
of member states with the ICCPR and to issue General Comments
interpreting rights enumerated within the ICCPR.127 For those
countries who signed on to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
however, the Committee took on an additional function: “to receive
and consider communications from individuals subject to its
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that [country] of
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”128
124.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 42nd Sess., Recommendations of the
Special
Rapporteur on “Human Rights
and Youth,” U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/36 (June 18, 1992), in International Law of Youth Rights,
supra note 51, at 360.
125.
Id at 361.
126.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 28, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 13 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
127.
Id. at art. 40.
128.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR Optional Protocol]. Upon receipt of
individual complaints, the HRC “must decide whether the state party has
violated a right secured under the ICCPR” and “is instructed to forward its views
to the State Party concerned and to the individual.” Henry J. Steiner, Individual
Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights
Committee?, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 15, 23 (Philip
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In the mid-1980s, the HRC began to hear individual
complaints from conscientious objectors denied recognition by their
national governments. The HRC’s jurisprudence registered the effect
of the Commission’s late-1980s move to recognize a right of
conscientious objection in Article 18 of the ICCPR. But, engaged in a
direct confrontation with states that might blithely violate such a
right if posited, the HRC was more reluctant to give the right of
conscientious objection a full-throated endorsement.
The Human Rights Committee first issued a substantive view
on conscientious objection in 1984. In L.T.K. v. Finland, a Finnish
citizen had been denied alternative service because he had not
“proven that serious moral considerations based on an ethical
conviction prevented the author from performing armed or unarmed
military service.”129 Accordingly, the Finnish government ordered the
citizen to perform armed service. After exhausting national appeals,
the citizen petitioned the HRC, arguing that his rights under Articles
18 and 19 of the ICCPR had been violated (the latter protecting the
right to freedom of opinion and expression).
The Committee did not decide the merits of the citizen’s claim
but rather found the petition itself inadmissible because neither
Article 18 nor Article 19 included a right of conscientious objection.
The HRC’s decision referred not just to the absence of such an explicit
right in Articles 18 and 19, but to the presence of “conscientious
objection” in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the Covenant. There, the HRC
acknowledged conscientious objection as an optional, but by no means
necessary, exception to compulsory military service.130 Because the
Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000) (internal quotations omitted). While such
decisional power is clearly adjudicatory in some sense, the “views” of the HRC are
not generally considered legally binding. See P.R. Gandhi, The Human Rights
Committee and the Right of Individual Communication 40–41 (1998) (noting that
while the Committee is not “a formal judicial body . . . [i]ts views read like
judgments of a court”). Yet many commentators treat them as an “authoritative
ascertainment of law.” Yuji Iwasawa, The Domestic Impact of International
Human Rights Standards, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty
Monitoring, supra, at 258. As Henry Steiner has suggested, the power of the HRC
to issue its views on individual cases was “feared by many states as the most
imposing or potentially threatening of the Committee’s powers.” Steiner, supra, at
23. Although neither the HRC’s views nor its General Comments may be selfexecuting international legal decisions, several countries’ constitutions demand
that they be considered in the formulation of national law. See Iwasawa, supra,
at 259.
129.
L.T.K. v. Finland, Comm. No. 185/1984, Rep. of the Human Rights
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 14th sess., Supp. No. 40, at 240, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985).
130.
Id. at 242.
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Committee did not find that a right to refuse military service existed
in the Covenant, the citizen could not petition the Committee to
decide whether such a right had been violated.
In 1991, two years after the passage of the Commission of
Human Rights’ 1989 resolution deriving a right of conscientious
objection from Article 18 of the Covenant,131 the HRC heard J.P. v.
Canada.132 The author of the petition, a Quaker, “refused to pay a
certain percentage of her assessed taxes, equal to the amount of the
Canadian federal budget earmarked for military appropriations.”133
Before ever being prosecuted, she sought a declaratory judgment from
Canadian courts that her refusal was lawful. National courts denied
her such a judgment. When the Canadian Internal Revenue Service
“threaten[ed] to collect the taxes owed,” the petitioner sought a
protective judgment from the HRC, arguing that payment of her back
taxes would violate her right to freedom of conscience under Article
18 of the Covenant.134
Given the author’s outlandish claim, this communication
seemed much simpler than L.T.K. v. Finland. As in L.T.K., the
Committee found the petition inadmissible, but not because Article 18
of the Covenant lacked a right of conscientious objection. Instead, the
Committee explicitly declared that “article 18 of the Covenant
certainly protects the right to hold, express and disseminate opinions
and convictions, including conscientious objection to military activities
and expenditures.”135 This declaration—contrary to the HRC’s finding
in L.T.K.—harmonized with the Commission on Human Rights’
intervening 1987 and 1989 resolutions that connected conscientious
objection to Article 18.136 Acknowledging the existence of a right of
conscientious objection, the HRC simply found that “refusal to pay
taxes on grounds of conscientious objection clearly falls outside the
scope of protection of this article.”137 Thus, the tax-resister had not
had her rights violated.

131.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
132.
J.P. v. Canada, Comm. No. 446/1991, Rep. of the Human Rights
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 426, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992).
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 427.
135.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
136.
While HRC decisions generally follow the Committee’s own
precedents, “[n]either the [Optional Protocol] nor the HRC’s rules of procedure
state that the HRC is bound by its previous decisions.” Kirsten A. Young, The Law
and Process of the U.N. Human Rights Committee 182 (2002).
137.
J.P. v. Canada, supra note 132, at 427.
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Two years later, in General Comment 22, the Committee’s
official interpretation of Article 18 of the ICCPR, the HRC moved
toward the Commission on Human Right’s endorsements of a right of
conscientious objection. General Comment 22 declared that:
The Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to
conscientious objection, but the Committee believes
that such a right can be derived from article 18,
inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may
seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and
the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.138
This passage generated significant debate at the HRC.
Committee members recognized that in declaring that a right of
conscientious objection could be derived from Article 18, the General
Comment overturned the HRC’s earlier decision in L.T.K. v. Finland
(though affirming J.P. v. Canada).139 On the other hand, as the U.K.
delegate pointed out, the “can be derived” language was a hedge: the
“paragraph did not seem to provide clear guidelines for State parties
on their obligation to grant the right of conscientious objection under
article 18, but merely indicated that it was possible to derive such a
right from that article.”140 Indeed, the HRC’s final language was more
reticent than the Commission of Human Rights’ most recent
treatment of conscientious objection. On March 10, 1993, the
Commission had re-affirmed “the right of everyone to have
conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate exercise of
the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.”141 The HRC
was not yet willing to speak so decisively when it came to interpreting
the binding language of the Covenant.

V. VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
In 1999, the HRC drew nearer to the Commission’s clear
statements linking a human right of conscientious objection to
Article 18 of the ICCPR. In Westerman v. Netherlands, as in
L.T.K. v. Finland, the Committee faced a case in which a country had
a system of conscientious objection but had refused to recognize the
138.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18, 48th
Sess. (July 30, 1993), in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 35 (1994).
139.
See Takemura, supra note 3, at 60.
140.
Id. at 60–61 (quoting U.K. delegate).
141.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1993/84 (Mar. 10, 1993), in
International Law of Youth Rights, supra note 51, at 383–85.
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particular petitioner as a legitimate objector.142 The Netherlands’ law
required that an objector have an “insurmountable objection of
conscience to military service because of the use of violent means.”143
State authorities determined that Westerman, who objected even to
non-combatant (and thus non-violent) duty, did not have such an
objection. In this case, the existence of a right of conscientious
objection was not the question in dispute, but rather the specific
content of that right. The HRC found that the Dutch standard
was compatible with Article 18, and refused to interpose its
own analysis of whether the petitioner’s beliefs met or did not meet
that standard.144
The
Westerman
majority
opinion
generated
two
dissenting opinions, one signed by the American member, famed
international lawyer Louis Henkin.145 The Henkin dissent argued
that the Dutch restriction of recognition to a specific type of
conscientious objection—an “insurmountable objection . . . because
of the use of violent means”—improperly differentiated “among
conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their
particular beliefs,” a differentiation prohibited by General
Comment 22.146 The dissent’s interpretation of the General Comment
cast doubt on all discriminations among potential conscientious
objectors. Such an interpretation could seriously undermine a
state’s ability to administer any form of compulsory military service.
The radicalism of the Henkin dissent signaled an increasingly
pro-conscientious-objection tendency on the Committee.
Seven years later, by 2006, staunch advocates of the human
right of conscientious objection found themselves in the majority. In
Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. Republic of Korea,147 the HRC
for the first time found a country in violation of Article 18 for its
failure to provide alternative service for those unwilling to perform
military service. Under its Military Service Act, the Republic of Korea

142.
Westerman v. Netherlands, Commc’n. No. 682/1996, Rep. of the
Human Rights Comm., U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 2, at 41, U.N.
Doc. A/55/40 (Nov. 3, 1999).
143.
Id. ¶¶ 6.5, 9.3.
144.
Id. ¶ 9.5.
145.
Id. at Individual Opinion (dissenting), P. Bhagwati, L. Henkin, C.
Medina Quiroga, F. Pocar, and M. Scheinin.
146.
Id.
147.
Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n. No. 1321-1322/2004,
Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N.
Doc. A/62/40, vol. II, annex VII, § 5, at 195 (Nov. 3, 2006).
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required over two years of military service of each male citizen.148 For
years, Jehovah’s Witnesses, who objected to all military service, had
been imprisoned for their draft resistance. Beginning in 2001, some
Buddhists and non-religious objectors began resisting the draft too,
and in 2002 a non-governmental group, Korean Solidarity for
Conscientious Objection, formed.149 In 2004, twenty-two Korean
congressmen drafted an amended Military Service Act with an
alternative service provision.150 The next year, the Korean National
Human Rights Commission also pushed for alternative service and
judicial recognition of conscientious objection as a legitimate exercise
of freedom of conscience.151
In this liberalizing national context, the HRC received a
petition from two South Korean Jehovah’s Witnesses whose
imprisonment for refusing to serve had been upheld by South Korea’s
highest court. Yoon and Choi complained that the absence of “an
alternative to compulsory military service, under pain of criminal
prosecution and imprisonment, breache[d] their rights under article
18, paragraph 1, of the [ICCPR].”152 Rather than contesting that
Article 18 of the ICCPR included a right of conscientious objection,
South Korea pointed out that while paragraph 1 of Article 18
acknowledges a right to freedom of conscience, paragraph 3 holds that
“[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.”153
In hindsight, it is surprising that Korea’s paragraph 3
challenge to the project of deriving a right of conscientious objection
from Article 18 of the Covenant had not arisen sooner. Of course,
when, in the mid- to late-1960s, non-governmental organizations first
formulated an international right of conscientious objection, they
referenced the Universal Declaration of Human Right’s Article 18,
not the recently-promulgated and still-unratified ICCPR.154 In later
UN documents referring to a right of conscientious objection,
148.
See Kuk Cho, Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Korea: The
Rocky Path from Being an Unpatriotic Crime to a Human Right, 9 Or. Rev. Int’l L.
187, 190 (2007).
149.
Id. at 195.
150.
Id.
151.
Id. at 196–97.
152.
Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, supra note 147, ¶ 3.
153.
G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 126, at art. 18, ¶ 3.
154.
See, e.g., International Peace Bureau, The Right to Refuse Military
Service, supra note 41, at 5 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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however, the two Article 18s were usually cited in tandem.155 Yet the
Covenant’s Article 18, unlike the UDHR’s, explicitly limits the right
of freedom of conscience in the interests of public safety, order, and
health.156 Compulsory military service, of course, is just the kind of
policy that is likely to be instituted when “public safety, order, [and]
health” are at risk.157 And, in Yoon, South Korea argued that being
“the world’s sole divided nation,” it was confronted with “specific
security circumstances” that made its system of compulsory military
service absolutely “necessary to protect public safety.”158
The right of conscientious objection first entered the
mainstream of UN discourse in 1978 by way of something of a
backdoor—through the General Assembly’s endorsement of objection
in the case of illegal, apartheid regimes that threatened populations’
right to self-determination. Then, at the Commission of Human
Rights during the 1980s and 1990s, older arguments for a universal
right of conscientious objection that had first gained prominence
during the Vietnam era piggy-backed onto the right to object to
apartheid service. Now, thirty years later, Korea insisted that its
right to secure—to determine—its own existence necessitated the
limitation of any right of conscientious objection. Korea’s argument
implied that a right of conscientious objection stood in inherent
conflict with the right of self-determination.
The HRC had to explain away this conflict. First, recalling its
“previous jurisprudence” in J.P. v. Canada and General Comment 22,
the Committee found that Yoon and Choi’s “refusal to be drafted for
compulsory service was a direct expression of their religious beliefs,”
and that their “conviction and sentence, accordingly, amounts to a
restriction on their ability to manifest their religion or belief” in
violation of Article 18, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.159 Having
established that a human right had been restricted, the Committee
asked if this restriction was “justified by the permissible limits
described in paragraph 3 of article 18, that is, that any restriction
must be prescribed by law and be necessary to protect public
155.
See, e.g., UN Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1989/59, supra note 123
(citing both the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR).
156.
Furthermore, in 2001, the HRC confirmed that while Article 18 rights
were non-derogable even in a state of emergency, the limitations of Article 18,
paragraph 3 were always in effect. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment
29, Article 4: Derogations During a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
157.
Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, supra note 147, ¶ 8.3.
158.
Id. ¶¶ 4.2–4.3, 8.3.
159.
Id. ¶ 8.3.
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safety.”160 Was South Korea’s restriction on petitioners’ right of
conscientious objection justified by a basic concern for public safety,
the right of a nation to sustain itself and protect its people?
To answer this question, the HRC turned not to a formalistic
discussion of rights but to actual national practice. Pointing to the
fact that “an increasing number of those States parties to the
Covenant which have retained compulsory military service have
introduced alternatives to compulsory military service,” the
Committee found that Korea had “failed to show what special
disadvantage would be involved for it” if it did fully respect the
petitioners’ rights of conscience or religious belief.161 Widespread
adoption of alternatives to compulsory national service undermined
Korea’s argument that public safety necessitated its refusal to
provide such alternatives. Consequently, the HRC found that Korea’s
facial violation of Article 18, paragraph 1 was not subject to a
paragraph 3 exception. Korea was thus “under an obligation to
provide [Yoon and Choi] with an effective remedy [for their
imprisonment], including compensation . . . [and] to avoid similar
violations of the Covenant in the future.”162
As discussed in the Introduction, Ruth Wedgwood, serving as
the United States’ HRC member, dissented from the majority view.
Wedgwood explained that she was “unable to conclude that the right
to refrain from mandatory military service is strictly required by the
terms of the Covenant, as a matter of law.”163 She criticized the
majority for citing “no evidence from the Covenant’s negotiating
history to suggest” that a distinction could be made between a
conscientious objection to military service and an objection to any
other legal obligation on the basis of religious belief or other
conviction.164 Highlighting the diffident language of the HRC’s
General Comment 22, Wedgwood noted that “in the interval of more
than a decade since [issuing the General Comment], the Committee
has never suggested in its jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol
that such a ‘derivation’ is in fact required by the Covenant.”165 She
finally noted that Article 8 of the ICCPR clearly discussed

160.
Id.
161.
Id. ¶ 8.4.
162.
Id. ¶ 10.
163.
Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, supra note 147, app. (Dissenting
Opinion by Committee Member Ms. Ruth Wedgwood).
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
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conscientious objection as an optional, rather than required,
component of compulsory military service.166
Wedgwood’s reasoning implied that the only valid method to
establish the human right of conscientious objection would be to
amend the ICCPR, explicitly introducing such a human right into
Article 18 or elsewhere in the Covenant. As we have seen, however,
transnational movements against colonialism and war took a
different path. Over the course of decades, these movements lobbied
the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly to link
Article 18 of the ICCPR with conscientious objection. This activism
bore fruit when first the General Assembly and then the Commission
derived a human right of conscientious objection from Article 18
(among other legal instruments). In turn, the HRC gradually
harmonized its own jurisprudence with the pro-conscientiousobjection stance that had emerged within other UN bodies.
Because “the HRC’s decisions must have their legal basis in
the ICCPR and the [Optional Protocol],”167 one might consider it
invalid for the Committee’s views to be influenced by decisions of
other UN bodies, previous Committee decisions that themselves
depart from a literal reading of the ICCPR,168 or social and political
change at the national level. Wedgwood’s dissent suggested as much.
Yet it is more useful to understand the Yoon decision as an
expression of the inherent challenges that international human rights
law must face in a world of nation-states than as an unfortunate
example of jurisprudential overreach.
For instance, given the plethora of UN charter and treaty
bodies authorized to interpret human rights law (each created by
different though overlapping sets of member states), lack of
coordination between these different bodies can undermine the
legitimacy of the human rights system as a whole.169 In this light, the

166.
Id.
167.
Young, supra note 136, at 33–34.
168.
In general, international norms of treaty interpretation require
respect for the “ordinary meaning” of the legal text. Elihu Lauterpacht, The
Development of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of
International Tribunals, 152 RCADI 337, 417 (1976). On the other hand,
Lauterpacht notes that where there is controversy about the best interpretation of
a provision, recourse to ordinary meaning is “tantamount to ignoring the
existence of controversy.” Id. at 418.
169.
See Young, supra note 136, at 26–27 (“While it is essential from the
point of view of credibility for the HRC to maintain its independence, lack of
coordination has led to . . . contradictory interpretations of states parties’
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evolution of HRC jurisprudence toward the Commission on Human
Rights’ position on conscientious objection may represent a search for
legitimating coordination among the “proliferation of bodies dealing
with human rights.”170
The HRC’s reliance on its own precedent, rather than on
evidence from ICCPR drafting sessions, may also reflect concerns
about—rather than indifference to—the legitimacy of human rights
jurisprudence. As Elihu Lauterpacht has observed, “in the case of
multilateral conventions . . . acceded to by States which have not
participated in the [original] negotiations,” negotiating history is a
particularly unreliable guide to the legitimate interpretation of
current signatories’ treaty obligations.171 As time goes by,
Lauterpacht argues, the past practice of a treaty body such as the
HRC may become a better guide to widely accepted interpretations of
a treaty.172 Indeed, international norms of treaty interpretation
recognize that treaty bodies are competent to interpret their own
constituent instruments and that, as a result, the meaning of
constituent instruments will change over time.173 Such a “living”
approach to interpretation may actually insure that human rights
law remains responsive to—and thus legitimate in the eyes of—the
states it seeks to govern.174
Along the same lines, Yoon’s reliance on developments in
national practice may indicate an effort to shore up the legitimacy of
human rights law. Faced with a world of nation-states, a human
rights body such as the HRC rests on particularly solid ground when
obligations that may also undermine the credibility of the HRC, and indeed the
entire human rights system.”).
170.
Id. at 23.
171.
Lauterpacht, supra note 168, at 440.
172.
Id. at 447–60.
173.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, art. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(3)(b) (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980) (describing past practice as a legitimate guide to a treaty’s
interpretation); Young, supra note 136, at 81 (noting that the ICCPR and the
Optional Protocol “must, as a result of the HRC’s practice, evolve and change in a
manner which may not have been predictable from the original wording of
the texts”); Felice Morgenstern, Legality in International Organizations, 48 Brit.
Y.B. Int’l L. 241, 253–54 (1976–77) (noting how a body’s competence to interpret
its own constituent instrument makes the legality of its decisions difficult
to challenge).
174.
For further discussion of responsive legal interpretation, see Philippe
Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law
(1978); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 Representations
13 (1990).
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it roots it decisions in actual state practice. Furthermore, failure to
modify the interpretation of human rights treaties in the face of
changing national practice could actually undermine acceptance of
those treaties.
As this discussion about the reasoning behind the Yoon
decision demonstrates, the tension between Wedgwood’s dissent and
the majority opinion is symptomatic of a more basic tension between
international human rights law and national sovereignty.175 In Yoon,
both Wedgwood and the HRC majority faced the challenge of
elaborating a legitimate system of universally-binding human rights
law in a world of sovereign nation-states. Wedgwood’s dissent implied
that this challenge could be best met by hewing as closely as possible
to the text of the ICCPR and the evidence left behind by the state
representatives who had drafted it. The majority opinion chose
instead to emphasize the HRC’s own past precedents—which
themselves were reflective of decisions reached by state
representatives to the General Assembly and the Commission on
Human Rights—and current state practice. In answering the
question of whether Article 18 of the ICCPR protected the right of
conscientious objection, Wedgwood and the majority disagreed about
the proper balance to accord competing international and national
authorities. Such disagreement may be inescapable. Indeed, as we
have seen, the anti-war and anti-colonial social movements that first
put the human right of conscientious objection on the UN’s agenda
had similar disagreements about the proper extent of such a right
and its ultimate relationship to national sovereignty.

VI. CONCLUSION
The HRC’s decision in Yoon was widely lauded by the antiwar and human rights communities as conclusive recognition that
Article 18 of the ICCPR includes a universal right of conscientious
objection.176 In 2008, however, South Korea decided not to create a

175.
See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
176.
See, e.g., Rachel Brett, International Standards on Conscientious
Objection to Military Service 1 (2008) (noting that the HRC has “recognised the
right of conscientious objection to military service” under Article 18 of the ICCPR
in Yoon and in other reports); Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Committee: Recent
Jurisprudence, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 567, 581 (2007) (“Yoon and Choi finally
establishes a right of conscientious objection to military service under Article 18 of
the ICCPR.”).
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system of alternative service for conscientious objectors.177 Nor have
the petitioners in Yoon received any compensation from the South
Korean government.178 In 2010 and 2011, the HRC re-affirmed its
decision in Yoon, finding that Korea continued to violate the rights of
conscientious objectors by refusing to offer them alternative service.179
In the wake of the 2010 decision, the Korean Ministry of Justice was
reportedly working with the National Human Rights Commission “to
search for effective ways of implementing” the HRC’s finding.180 Yet
on August 30, 2011, Korea’s Constitutional Court upheld the nation’s
unreformed compulsory military service policy, finding that it did not
violate freedom of conscience.181 Thus, while the Commission on
Human Rights and the HRC have codified and implemented a right of
conscientious objection, such a right cannot by itself pierce the veil of
national sovereignty.182
Thanks to Korea’s ongoing internal debates over HRC
doctrine, the shadow of sovereignty continues to fall across the right
of conscientious objection. As Ruth Wedgwood’s terse dissent
indicated, a right of conscientious objection failed to gain traction
during the ICCPR drafting sessions precisely because such a right
threatened member states’ sovereign control of their own military
policies. How, then, could the HRC find that Korea had violated the
ICCPR by prosecuting conscientious objectors? This Article has
attempted to answer that question. It has recounted the process by
177.
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to Conscription, Reuters, Dec. 24, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008
/12/24/us-korea-objectorsidUSTRE4BN0D820081224 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
178.
E-mail from Yoon Jin Shin, J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law Sch., to the
author (May 17, 2012, 10:29 EST) (on file with author).
179.
Eu-min Jung v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n. Nos. 1593–1603/2007,
Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/
1593–1603/2007 (Mar. 23, 2010); Min-Kyu Jeong v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n.
Nos. 1642–1741/2007, Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/101/D/1642–1741/2007 (Mar. 24, 2011).
180.
Lee Hyo-Sik, Conscientious Military Service Objectors Will Appeal to
UN, Korea Times, May 6, 2010 (on file with author).
181.
See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2007Hun-Ka12, 2009HunBa103 (consol.), Aug. 30, 2011, (23-2(A) KCCR, 132) (S. Kor.); Constitutional
Court [Const. Ct.], 2008Hun-Ka22, Aug. 30, 2011, (23-2(A) KCCR, 174) (S. Kor.).
182.
On the problem of the effectiveness of the HRC, see generally Markus
G. Schmidt, Follow-Up Mechanisms Before UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and
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which anti-war and anti-colonial activists worked to challenge
national polices—of war-making and apartheid—at the UN. Both
groups of activists converged on the figure of the conscientious
objector as a vehicle for the international critique of member states’
legal and political regimes. This anti-war and anti-colonial advocacy,
in turn, shaped the reasoning by which the Commission on Human
Rights, the General Assembly, and the HRC did, eventually, declare a
right of conscientious objection. Yet that right of conscientious
objection remains constrained by the same force that continually
delayed its invention: the unwillingness of nation-states to jeopardize
their sovereignty.
This history of ongoing struggle complicates any simple
opposition between collective rights to self-determination and
individual human rights, national sovereignty and international law.
In seeking to transform national programs of conscription and
apartheid, transnational anti-war and anti-colonial activists invoked
both human rights and rights to self-determination. Both rights
traditions contributed to the invention of the right of conscientious
objection. Indeed, in the eyes of activists, the conscientious objector
was both a national and an international citizen; a participant in the
self-determination of his people and an advocate of international
prohibitions on war and apartheid.
Today, in the Republic of Korea and across the globe, the
transnational movement in favor of conscientious objection continues
to challenge national programs that deny the individual’s right to
refuse military service on conscientious grounds. Neither the original
meaning of Article 18 of the ICCPR nor the formal limits of national
sovereignty will decide the outcome of this contest. Instead, the fate
of the human right of conscientious objection will depend on
continuing international efforts to shape the meaning of Article 18,
and continuing national efforts to invoke that meaning within the
“national frame.”183
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